FORCING FAIRNESS IN STATE TAXATION
Randall J. Gingiss*
On November 1, 2005, the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (hereafter
“Panel”) issued its report entitled Simple, Fair & Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America’s Tax
System.1 The Panel stated as its hoped for accomplishments:
The Simplified Income Tax Plan dramatically simplifies our tax code, cleans out targeted tax
breaks that have cluttered the system, and lowers rates. It does away with gimmicks and hidden
traps like the Alternative Minimum Tax. It preserves and simplifies major features of our current
tax code, including benefits for home ownership, charitable giving, and health care, and makes
2
them available to all Americans.

The plan included among its features:
Extension of important tax benefits for home ownership and charitable giving to
all taxpayers, not just the 35 percent who itemize;3
Elimination of the Alternative Minimum Tax...4
Elimination of the deduction for state and local taxes.5
This last proposal contradicts that stated goals the Panel hopes to accomplish. If the Panel’s
recommendations are to be seriously considered, what follows in this article will recommend that
state and local taxes be available “not just [for] the 35 percent who itemize,” which is the law as
it stands now. Instead, a federal tax benefit for state and local taxes, in the form of a credit,
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should be available for all taxpayers.
In considering the possible elimination of the deduction for state and local taxes, Congress
should consider that state budgets are in trouble. One estimate is that in the fiscal years ending
June, 2003, states faced revenue shortfalls of $21.5 billion, in some cases as much as 25% of
their annual budget and state governments were faced with some politically unpalatable choices
to remedy the shortfall.6 For the following fiscal year (2003-2004), one analyst suggests that
California alone faced a deficit of $34.6 billion.7 In 2003, Congress attempted to remedy this
problem with $20 billion in aid over two years, but it was a temporary measure that expired in
June, 2004.8 Constitutional balanced budget requirements in many states as well as difficulties in
enacting tax increases at the state level contribute to funding problems.9
This article will suggest that, at least for states with a low income tax, a modest amendment to
the Internal Revenue Code, changing the deduction for state income taxes10 to a credit, will help
states find a politically acceptable way to end the crises. The cost will be some loss of Federal
revenue, but making up for that loss will be the focus of someone else’s article.11 Walter Heller
advocated a credit forty-five years ago and it is appropriate to reexamine his recommendation.12
The Panel’s recommendations, part of an effort by the Bush administration to overhaul the
Internal Revenue Code, advocate eliminating the deduction for state and local taxes to finance
elimination of other undesirable taxes, such as those on savings and investment.13 The report,
while recommending such elimination, also made a recommendation on mortgage interest similar
6
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to what this author is recommending on income tax, namely, changing the deduction for
mortgage interest to a credit.14
Forty-one states and the District of Columbia have enacted a broad based personal income tax as
a major source of revenue. As of September, 2000, the income tax represented thirty-seven
percent of all state tax collections, the largest single source of state tax revenues.15 To many, this
is the most equitable form of taxation. Enacting an income tax has never been a popular idea.16
The existence of a Federal income tax deduction for state income taxes has never been much of
an incentive. I am suggesting that amending the Internal Revenue Code to allow a credit for state
income taxes paid up to some maximum percentage of taxable income and eliminating the
deduction will allow states without an income tax to enact a state income tax up to the credit
without a cost to the taxpayer, and in states which already have an income tax, to give a tax
benefit to lower income taxpayers. There will be revenue loss to the Federal government,
whether great or small depending on the size of the credit.17
Income taxes have the advantage that they can be made to be progressive, whereas sales taxes
tend to be single rated. While some commodities can have a higher sales tax (such as alcohol or
tobacco) and some can be exempted (such as medicine or groceries), the general rule is a single
rate. Such a tax is not, and could not easily be made, progressive with respect to the amount of
consumption by each particular taxpayer or consumer,18 although exempting items such as
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medicine and groceries can make them less regressive.19 There are steps states themselves can
do in conjunction with my suggestions to increase fairness. One author’s suggestion is that states
should take three steps: place more emphasis on income taxes; increase the progressivity of their
rate structures; and expand consumption taxes to reach more consumer services as well as
goods.20
This article will review some history of state taxation in the United States, then discuss concepts
of fairness as viewed by various commentators, look at the experience under the Federal estate
tax where the reverse of this author’s recommendation, in steps from 2002 to 2005, has been
accomplished (going from a credit for state death taxes to a deduction, and then analyze why a
credit will be fairer to taxpayers and to the states.
I. A Brief History of State Taxation
Prior to 1900, states and local governments relied primarily on a property tax for their revenues.
In the early part of our history, wealth was defined primarily in the form of real property, and a
tax on property most effectuated an ability-to-pay philosophy. In 1890, the property tax
produced 72% of state revenues and 92% of local revenues. In the early 1800s, more than 80%
of the populace lived in rural areas so that a tax levied on the value of land affected most of the
population and had the effect of taxing the holders of the most valuable land most heavily.21
Toward the middle of the 19th century, significant changes in wealth and wealth accumulation came about:
[E]arly in the 1800s, wealth was defined in terms of property. As the century progressed, however,
dramatic societal changes occurred. New kinds of wealth, in the form of commercial paper, stocks,
and other evidences of debt, were expanding but were not being reached by the property tax
system. The property tax system also was not reaching salaries. The increase in both mercantile
and manufacturing activity brought large new populations to the cities, and these populations
22
depended on salaries for their livelihood.

By the time the 16th amendment to the United States Constitution was ratified in 1913, most of
the states had adapted to the new economic conditions with some sort of inheritance tax or
income tax with progressive rates and high exemptions.23 The panic of 1837 resulted in a
number of income taxes, although in that period the taxes collected were trifling. In
19
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Pennsylvania, for example, in 1840, the income tax was at a rate of 1% on salaries and one-tenth
of one percent on other income. All such taxes in that period were administrative failures.24
Wisconsin’s income tax enacted in 1913, with rates beginning at one percent and going to six
percent for incomes in excess of $12,000, proved the first successful income tax, and several
other states followed shortly thereafter. After a lull, more states followed after the stock market
crash of 1929.25 It should also be born in mind that prior to the New Deal with the election of
Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932, the states, and not the federal government, collected the major
share of the taxes imposed in the country. The New Deal made the federal income taxes
considerably more progressive and burdensome.26 With maximum federal income tax rates
approaching 90%, some sort of tax relief was necessary for state income taxes to ensure that the
combined federal and state tax rate did not exceed 100% of a taxpayer’s income.27
II. Neutrality and forum shopping.
The cost of any state tax to the resident is going to be a function of the amount of the tax itself
less any tax benefit received under the Internal Revenue Code.28 States will have an incentive to
enact those taxes with the least cost to the taxpayer. When Congress eliminated the deduction
for state sales taxes in 1986,29 it thereby increased the cost of sales taxes to the states’
inhabitants. The cost of all deductible state taxes increased with the lowering of federal tax rates
or increased standard deduction as the deduction for state taxes was worth less.30 It also should
be noted, however, that the deduction for state sales taxes cost the federal government less than
24
25
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other deductible taxes since more of the sales taxes were paid by lower income taxpayers who
often took the standard deduction, or even if they itemized deductions, took such deductions at
lower tax rates.31 One would think that elimination of the deduction for state sales taxes while allowing it for
32

state income taxes, would cause states to shift their tax burdens to an income tax,
has occurred.

but there is no indication that this

Giving a credit for the income tax instead of a deduction will not only make the income tax less expensive for many
states (costless for states whose income tax is equal to the amount of the credit), but also will make the tax benefit
from state taxes less regressive. A deduction benefits high bracket taxpayers because the higher the tax rate, the
higher the benefit from any dollar of deduction. A deduction is of no benefit at all for those taking the standard
33
deduction. A credit of one dollar will benefit the taxpayer by a full dollar.
Giving a credit rather than a deduction will also decrease competition among states to attract business and residents
by lower income taxes. While taxes are not necessarily the major factor in determining the location of a business in
particular compared to other factors such as education and productivity of the labor force, access to markets, and
34
availability of cheap and plentiful water and power, fear of interstate competition can be a factor in the discussion.
Most of the states which have an income tax give a credit for income taxes paid to other states, at least where the
35
other state reciprocates. There appears to be no constitutional requirement for this as the United States Supreme
36
Court has consistently held that the due process clause is no bar to double taxation.
In at least one other area, Congress has gone in the opposite direction of this author’s recommendations. Congress
eliminated a credit against the Federal estate tax for state death taxes paid which had been limited to a maximum
37
38
amount depending on the size of the taxable estate. The credit phased out in favor of a deduction in 2005, which
39
is discussed in more detail later in this article. The credit for state death taxes against the federal estate tax was
31
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enacted in 1926 when Congress was contemplating a reduction in Federal estate tax rates because of reduced federal
40
revenue needs once World War I had ended. One of the original purposes of the credit for state death taxes against
the federal estate tax was to eliminate forum shopping and attempts to attract wealthy residents by the promise of no
41
state death taxes. Uniformity of state income tax laws should further discourage forum shopping.
Forcing uniformity of state income tax laws could come from three sources: the Supreme Court, the states themselves
42
by voluntary action, or by Congressional mandate. The Supreme Court has so far declined to intervene. States
have shown no inclination to act, other than to give generous credits on taxes paid to other states. Bills have been
introduced to Congress on numerous occasions to limit the ability of states to tax income on multi-state transactions,
43
but none has made it out of committee.
III. Fairness
Fairness, or at least the perception of fairness, is an important goal of the tax system. Taxpayers should be taxed in
44
accordance with their ability to pay and income is a good approximation of that ability. To fine tune that ability,
the Internal Revenue Code starts with a definition of gross income that includes wages, salary, tips, dividends,
45
46
47
interest, rents, and royalties. Certain items, like municipal bond income, most life insurance proceeds, and
48
gifts and inheritances are excluded from the definition of income. The taxpayer is allowed certain deductions
49
50
51
against gross income, including personal exemptions, business deductions and personal deductions. For most
52
53
individuals, the standard deduction is used instead of itemized deductions. The result is a computation of taxable
40
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54

income to which the taxpayer applies tax rates varying from 15% to 35% to determine a tentative tax. From this
55
are subtracted credits to determine tax liability. Certain credits are refundable, meaning that if the credit exceeds
56
57
the tentative tax, the excess is refunded to the taxpayer. This includes the credit for withholding by an employer.
States with an income tax follow a similar pattern. Most use federal adjusted gross income as the starting point in
58
determining the state individual income tax base. Thirty-three have their own progressive tax structure, and three
levy the state tax as a percentage of the federal tax liability, thereby accepting federal progressivity. Some states have
59
a flat rate with some sort of exemption. The income level at which the highest marginal tax rate is reached in some
progressive tax structure states is low; which for the wealthy may have the same effect as a flat tax. Minnesota has
60
the highest marginal tax rate at 14.0 percent.
The public seems to view the sales tax as the most equitable. The sales tax happens every time one makes a
61
purchase, and it applies in equal proportion to all purchases. It is the most visibly equal of all the taxes. What is
62
odd about the perception is that when state sales taxes were first introduced in the 1930s, they were deemed a
temporary measure due to the fiscal crisis brought about by declines in income from the depression, adopted with
63
considerable ambivalence. One author explains the public perception this way:
An alternative explanation for why state and local governments have continued to rely on the
retail sales tax despite its nondeductibility is grounded in cognitive theory. Recent research has
demonstrated that individuals often exhibit a cognitive bias that leads them to underestimate
aggregate cost when it is presented in the form of several smaller costs. For example, as Slemrod
52
53
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Forman, supra note , at 599.
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and Krishna explain, it is a common marketing gimmick to express the cost for some item in terms
of "cost per day" or some other such unit. Thus, an item or service that costs $300 per year may be
advertised as "pennies per day!" Presenting the cost this way leaves the consumer with the
impression that the item is cheaper than it actually is. In the same way, it is often difficult for
taxpayers to recognize how much they actually pay in retail sales taxes because the tax is collected
in small amounts over the course of several months in hundreds of separate purchases. While the
64
total tax imposed may be the same, the perceived tax is substantially less.

This is not to say state sales tax rates cannot be adjusted. Rates on cigarettes and alcohol are
sometimes higher, and sometimes rates on items of food and prescription drugs can be lower or
zero.65 There has been much comment in recent years to expand the sales tax to cover services, and not merely
tangible personal property.

66
67

The general consensus among writers, however, seems to be that sales taxes are regressive. Several studies have
indicated that the percentage of income used to pay sales taxes for low income earners is significantly higher than for
68
top income earners. One study concluded that “[s]ales and excise taxes everywhere are regressive, often
shockingly so: they can create unconscionable hardships for people living in poverty, they represent real financial
69
burdens for middle-class families, and they let the rich, particularly the super rich, off the hook almost entirely.”
To some degree, exempting food, housing and medical care from the sales tax can reduce the degree of regressivity
70
and cause some scholars to doubt that sales taxes are regressive at all. Further, the inability to tax certain crossborder transactions, such as those engaged in over e-commerce, in effect gives additional, unintended exemptions
71
from the sales tax.
To one at the lower end of the economic spectrum, a sales tax and an income tax at the same rate should make no
difference. The sales tax will be exacted at the time of expenditure, and will be gradual over the course of the year.
The income tax will be exacted at the time of earning which, with withholding, will also be gradual. As long as the
taxpayer spends all that he earns, the amount taken should be the same. The two taxes diverge when the taxpayer
does not spend all of his or her income. At that point, a sales tax will leave the unspent income untaxed while an
72
income tax will not. While this divergence makes the income tax more equitable, the involuntary nature of the
64
65
66
67
68
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income tax more justifies a tax break, be it deduction or credit, than for a sales tax, the transactions giving rise to
73
which are involuntary only for necessities. The taxes will also diverge as more of the economy shifts to services
rather than tangible goods, as long as services are not taxed under the sales tax. As a result, sales taxes as a
74
percentage of gross state product have been declining.
A deduction for state and local taxes was part of the first income tax enacted in 1861 and has been a part of every
75
76
income tax law since. State and local sales taxes were deductible through 1986. The decision to repeal the
deductibility of state sales taxes has been criticized as penalizing those states which rely heavily on the sales tax as a
77
means of generating revenue and that it skews the tax system away from a tax that many consider preferable.
Another criticism is that deductibility aids states in raising revenue, but that same study also indicated that a stronger
78
case can be made for deductibility of state income taxes.
State income taxes are a cost
79
80
of producing income and should be deductible like any other cost of producing income. In response to claims
that the deduction only for state income taxes and not for sales taxes was unfair to those states without an income
81
tax, Congress temporarily has restored the deduction for state sales tax as an alternative to a deduction for state
82
83
income taxes. The change is applicable for tax years beginning after 2003 and before 2006.
What is interesting is that when the deduction for state and local sales taxes was abolished in 1986, there was some
movement afoot to eliminate the deduction for all state taxes, which brought about a significant amount of opposition
73
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84

for states that said it would raise the effective marginal rate for state income taxes. The Reagan Plan opposed
85
continuing the deduction precisely because it favored high income taxpayers, although the same can be said for any
deduction.
86

The Panel has also made a recommendation to eliminate the deduction for all state and local taxes. The rationale
for its decision reiterated the concern that it favored high income taxpayers but added a few wrinkles of its own,
namely having all taxpayers in the country subsidize high tax states and uneven application because of the alternative
minimum tax (“AMT”):
The state and local tax deduction forces residents of low-tax jurisdictions to subsidize government
services received by taxpayers in high-tax jurisdictions. As with many other tax benefits, the state
and local tax deduction requires higher tax rates for everyone, but the benefits of the deduction are
not shared equally among taxpayers. The deduction is limited to itemizers, and households with
higher income and tax rates receive a greater share of the benefit from the deduction. Even among
itemizers, the benefits of the deduction are not shared evenly, as the AMT is increasingly erasing
the benefit of the state and local tax deduction for many middle-class taxpayers. Depending on the
year, between 64 and 70 percent of taxpayers with adjusted gross income over $100,000 who
would no longer receive a deduction for state and local taxes also would have paid higher taxes
87
under the AMT, which is repealed under the Panel’s options.

Changing the deduction to a credit would produce a zero marginal rate up to the amount of the
credit and benefit many more lower income taxpayers. Whether or not benefitting the masses
would produce sufficient political power to get such an initiative passed is, at least in the view of
one author, unlikely:
The experience which we have had over the last several decades indicates that three significant
factors must be present in order for personal deductions to be characterized as having significant
political staying power. First, there must be a great mass of taxpayers who benefit from the
deduction, and who can predictably recognize the financial benefit which they will derive from
continuation of the deduction. Second, we find that there is a symbiotic economic relationship
between this great mass of taxpayers who claim the deduction and others who are politically
powerful and who also benefit from the deduction claimed by the masses. Typically, the powerful
beneficiaries enjoy only an indirect advantage from the deduction being accorded to the masses.
On other occasions, the benefit enjoyed by the politically powerful group is a direct one. The
existence of such a group is important since the masses are often too poorly organized for effective
political activity and rely on the powerful group to carry out lobbying activities which make use of
84
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85
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the masses and of the political contacts enjoyed by the powerful group. Finally, because we seem
incapable of engaging in thoroughly crass political grabs for economic benefit, it is necessary that
some lofty platitude be conjured up which serves as an altruistic fig leaf to cover over the selfinterest of the masses and the politically powerful lobbying forces. It should be noted that this last
requirement is the least consequential; past experience seems to indicate that virtually any sort of
88
altruistic fig leaf, no matter how ill-fitting, seems to do the job.

Saving the deduction for state and local income taxes (actually all state and local taxes other than
the sales tax) was no small effort. Elimination of the deduction was a cornerstone of the Reagan
Plan in that it would save $150 billion over five years.89 The issue of deduction of state and local
taxes threatened to scuttle the entire Tax Reform Act of 1986.90 Nor was this a matter of low tax
states versus high tax states,91 a strategy employed by the Reagan administration to push the
legislation forward. A list of 208 House members who would vote against the bill if the
deduction were eliminated ensured that some part of the deduction would remain at the cost of a
higher top marginal tax bracket than the Reagan administration wanted.92
Having state income taxes be deductible is regressive. Any deduction is worth more to high
income taxpayers than low income simply because the deduction reduces the tax base at a higher
tax bracket. A $1,000 deduction at 35% is obviously worth $200 more than a deduction at 15%.
Further, those who itemize deductions are significantly wealthier than those who do not.93 Roughly
94

Having a credit for state income taxes instead of a
two-thirds of all taxpayers take the standard deduction.
deduction will reduce, but not eliminate, the regressivity since a $100 credit is worth the same to both taxpayers, but
if the percentage of income limit for the credit is constant, the wealthy will have a higher tax base against which to
measure the credit.
95

As discussed earlier, the idea of a credit instead of a deduction is not new.
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96

been a credit for state death taxes paid, up to certain defined progressive limits depending on the size of the
97
estate. Prior to the phase out of the credit, all states incorporated the state death tax credit into their scheme of
death taxation. The overwhelming majority of states had no death tax except for a “pick up” tax, a tax designed to
98
be equal to this Federal credit for state death taxes. Florida, by its constitution, limits any death tax to one which
99
imposes no additional burden on its taxpayers, in other words, to a pick up tax.
100

The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 phased out of state death tax credit
101
Janiga and Harrison, in opposing this change even prior to its enactment,
and substituted a deduction instead.
focused on forum shopping as one of the evils that repeal of the credit would engender:
One of the original purposes of the state death tax credit was to eliminate a state's incentive to
attract residents by having little or no state death taxes. If the credit is replaced with a deduction,
the incentive may resurface. As a result, certain states might be tempted to lower their death taxes
when modifying their laws to account for the elimination of the credit. Conversely, states that have
a substantial amount of retirement-age citizens, such as Florida, Arizona, and California, may be
encouraged to increase their state death taxes in an effort to increase state revenues.
Because state death tax laws will, in any event, be diverse, couples will be tempted to engage in
'forum shopping,' particularly in retirement, because of favorable death tax laws. Any law that
inadvertently results in forum shopping is adverse to the overall goodwill of society because the
federal government placing states in direct competition with one another is contrary to sound
102
public policy and should be avoided.
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Changing the deduction for state and local income taxes to a credit would not be the first time
Congress has changed a deduction to a credit, with the result of making the tax benefit available
to those taxpayers who do not itemize deductions. With the enactment of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, Congress enacted a deduction for certain child care expenses up to a limit of
$600.103 The deduction was aimed at low income women and widowed taxpayers and
adjustments were made from time to time to adjust the limits of deductibility. Married taxpayers
had to file jointly to receive the deduction.104
The change from deduction to credit came with the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.105
The credit was equal to twenty percent of employment-related expenses, subject to a limitation
of $2,000 for one qualifying individual and $4,000 for two or more qualifying individuals, not to
exceed the lower of their respective incomes.106
The Panel has embraced this idea in a totally different format, namely, changing the deduction
for home mortgage interest to a credit with a much lower cap than under current law. Under
current law, a taxpayer may deduct interest on up to $1 million of mortgage debt on a first or
second home and interest on home equity loans on loan amounts up to $100,000.107 The Panel
recommends that the deduction be eliminated in favor of a credit equal to 15% of the home
mortgage interest paid on a primary residence, with the amount of mortgage upon which interest
could be deducted be subject to a limit based on local housing markets. Any tax benefit for
second mortgages or home equity loans would be eliminated.108 The benefits claimed are that
many who do not receive any tax benefit from mortgage interest would then receive a benefit and
that the proposal would favor low income taxpayers.109
IV. Revenue Sharing
Deductions or credits for state and local taxes is a form of revenue sharing. The existence of a
state or local tax, which increases state or local revenues, lessens the federal tax burden. It has
the advantage (or disadvantage, depending on one’s perspective) of subsidizing state revenues
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without federal oversight,110 although President Nixon succeeded in obtaining relatively string
free revenue sharing for states in 1972.111 This program was phased out, starting in 1980,112 and
eliminated by 1986.113 One other obvious form of revenue sharing is the exclusion of municipal
bond income from the federal income tax,114 which, as of 1995, subsidized state governments in
the amount of $12.9 billion in saved interest costs.115
V. Alternative minimum tax considerations.
Any discussion of the treatment of the payment of state and local income taxes must address how
this will integrate with the alternative minimum tax.116 The alternative minimum tax came about
because Congress was concerned that it was perhaps being too generous with the preferences it
gave taxpayers in the form of deductions and wanted to ensure that taxpayers with many
preference items paid some minimum amount of tax.117 It was originally conceived in 1969
because then acting Treasury secretary, James W. Barr, was concerned that 155 taxpayers with
adjusted gross incomes in excess of $200,000 in 1966 paid no federal income tax.118 Although
this tax was aimed at 155 individuals, by 1999 it had affected 1 million taxpayers and the number
was estimated to increase to an astronomical 36 million by 2010.119 The Panel estimated the
110
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number at 21.6 million in 2006 and 52 million in 2015.120 At least part of this increase in the
number of taxpayers can be attributed to a lower of regular income tax by recent tax acts.121
The alternative minimum tax operates by producing its own tax base (alternative minimum
taxable income) which is broader than the tax base for the regular income tax because of fewer
deductions.122 This higher base is reduced by a large exemption ($58,000 for married taxpayers
filing a joint return in 2005).123 The tax base less the exemption yields the “taxable excess, ” the
tax on which is 26% of the first $175,000 of taxable excess and 28% of amounts in excess of
$175,000.124 The alternative minimum tax is technically the amount by which this tentative tax
exceeds the taxpayer’s regular tax liability,125 but as a practical matter, this means one pays the
higher of the alternative minimum tax and the regular income tax liability. While the use of
preferences for those with taxable incomes in excess of $200,000 attracted the attention that gave
rise to the tax, in 2002, 1.4% of filers with taxable incomes between $50,000 and $75,000 faced
alternative minimum tax liability and 3% of taxpayers between $75,000 and $100,000 faced
alternative minimum tax liability. By 2010, one estimate has these figures rising to 43% and 79%
respectively.126
What makes this relevant to any credit for state income taxes is that state and local income taxes
are not deductible for purposes of the alternative minimum tax. They must be added back to
taxable income to get alternative minimum taxable income.127 Eliminating the deduction for
state and local income taxes for purposes of the regular income tax will increase taxable income
and lower the gap between taxable income and alternative minimum taxable income, thereby
tending to reduce alternative minimum tax. On the other hand, giving a credit against regular tax
liability and not against the alternative minimum tax will widen the gap in taxes imposed and
increase the applicability of the alternative minimum tax. Giving a credit against both taxes will
keep in the tendency to reduce the gap without the offsetting increase when the credit is only
available to the regular tax. If Congress is consistent in its purpose behind the alternative
minimum tax, it seems likely that any change would require that there be no credit against the
120
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alternative minimum tax for any state and local income taxes. Of course, if Congress repeals the
deduction for state and local taxes or the alternative minimum tax, as recommended by the Panel,
the point may be totally moot.128
VI. Conclusion
Changing the deduction for state and local income taxes to a credit is not a new idea, but one
which needs to be seriously reconsidered. It is in line with the Panel’s recommendations
regarding a tax benefit for the payment of mortgage interest. Enactment of such a change will
compel states without an income tax to enact one and allow them to give some relief to lower
income taxpayers by reducing more regressive taxes. In all states, such a change will allow
taxpayers who do not itemize deductions to get a benefit on their federal income tax from state
income taxes paid. Higher income taxpayers in states with a high income tax will be hurt by the
change, but if the goal is to make taxes more progressive, that is not necessarily a bad result.
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